Introduction: Flexibility should not mean financial insecurity
Digital platforms have transformed how Malaysians earn a living. E-hailing drivers, food-delivery riders, couriers and other gig workers can choose when to work, supplement their income and access customers through digital technology. These benefits matter, particularly in a labour market where flexibility and alternative income opportunities are valuable.
However, flexibility does not automatically translate into economic security. A worker may be free to log in and out of an application yet have limited influence over remuneration, task allocation, performance ratings, incentive rules or account suspension. The platform's technology can therefore become a powerful mechanism for determining the practical terms of work.
Malaysia has already taken an important legislative step through the Gig Workers Act 2025 (Act 872), which became operational on 31 March 2026. The Act establishes rights concerning contractual terms, earnings, automated monitoring and decision-making, deactivation, social security, occupational safety and dispute resolution. It also creates a Gig Workers Consultative Council and a Gig Workers Tribunal.¹,²
The policy challenge has consequently changed. Malaysia no longer needs to begin by designing an entirely new legal framework. It needs to ensure that existing rights are effective, address gaps in the coverage and detail of the current law, and learn from international approaches that have tested ways to make platform work fairer.
China's proposed labour-protection measures, Singapore's enacted platform-worker legislation, Australia's minimum-standards framework, the European Union's Platform Work Directive and emerging International Labour Organization standards offer different kinds of lessons. They should not be treated as equivalent: some are binding laws, some are proposals or announced measures, and some are international or empirical reference points.
Malaysia could also consider a dedicated Gig Worker Protection and Transition Fund, financed partly by larger platform operators. The recent decision to establish a Postal Service Fund using the institutional model of Malaysia's telecommunications Universal Service Provision (USP) Fund provides a relevant example of how a sector-specific funding mechanism can support a defined public-policy objective.¹⁵,¹⁶
The objective should be clear: preserve the legitimate flexibility of platform work while ensuring that workers receive fair treatment, meaningful social protection, accountable algorithmic management and a reasonable ability to challenge decisions affecting their livelihoods.
1. Malaysia has established a legal foundation, but implementation matters
Act 872 establishes a statutory framework specifically for gig workers. It requires service agreements to specify matters including the services to be provided, the parties' obligations, earnings rates and payment arrangements. Workers must be informed of the agreed rate before undertaking a service and consulted and informed when the contractual terms change. The Act also prohibits discrimination in working conditions, service assignment and payment of earnings.¹
For platform workers, section 8(2) requires information about automated monitoring and decision-making systems and provides for a non-automated review mechanism. Section 14 establishes procedures concerning deactivation, including an inquiry process and remedies where a suspension or modification is found unjustified. The Act also recognises gig workers' rights to form, join and participate in associations.
Dispute resolution is another important improvement. The framework provides for internal grievance mechanisms, conciliation and a specialist tribunal. Parts VIII and IX address social security and occupational safety and health, respectively.¹,²
These provisions should not be understated. Malaysia already has several protections that policymakers might otherwise propose borrowing from foreign jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, a statutory right is only as useful as the process through which a worker can exercise it. A formal right to review an automated decision may offer little practical protection if the worker cannot understand the reasons for the decision, obtain the relevant records or secure a timely reconsideration by someone with authority to correct an error.
The same principle applies to earnings. A contractual right to know the agreed rate is valuable, but it does not necessarily explain how incentives, waiting time, cancellations, deductions or changes in platform pricing affect the worker's final remuneration.
Malaysia should therefore concentrate on making existing rights measurable, accessible and enforceable before adding overlapping obligations. The measures proposed below are recommendations, not descriptions of current Malaysian law unless expressly identified as such.
2. Malaysian research shows why further protection is justified
Policy reform should be grounded in evidence from Malaysia rather than assumptions drawn entirely from foreign markets.
Mohd Daud, Osman, Samsudin and Phang (2024) examined financial resilience among 452 Malaysian gig workers using survey data collected between June and November 2022. Their study found low resilience against adverse financial shocks, with income, age and financial literacy among the relevant determinants. The authors highlighted the need for better-targeted financial education, income support and regulatory protection.⁵
The study does not establish that every gig worker experiences financial hardship, nor does it provide a current census of the gig workforce. It nevertheless provides empirical evidence of an important policy question: how can workers manage income volatility and build financial security when their earnings and access to work may fluctuate?
Occupational health is another concern. Daud and colleagues (2025) studied 191 food-delivery riders in Eastern Peninsular Malaysia. The cross-sectional study reported work-related musculoskeletal disorders among 74.9% of the participants and identified associations with factors including working days, vibration exposure and exercise habits.⁶ These findings relate to a particular sample and should not be interpreted as a national prevalence estimate.
The results nevertheless support targeted preventive measures for delivery workers, whose work exposes them to physical demands and road-safety risks.
Malaysia's platform-worker disputes provide further evidence of the issues workers consider important. Uchiyama, Furuoka and Omar (2025) analysed food-delivery boycotts in 2022 and 2024, examining worker resistance, organising and the relationship between platforms and riders.⁷ This research illustrates that disputes over earnings, working arrangements and collective voice are established features of Malaysia's platform economy.
Together, these studies support further action on income security, occupational safety and worker representation. They do not justify claiming that all platform work is exploitative or that every platform uses unfair algorithms. Effective regulation must distinguish documented risks from allegations that require further investigation.
3. Algorithmic fairness: the next major regulatory challenge
One of the most important issues for Malaysia is the growing influence of algorithmic management.
Platforms use automated systems to match customers and workers, calculate or present earnings, monitor performance, allocate incentives and identify possible misconduct. Some decisions may be routine and beneficial. Others can materially affect a worker's income or ability to continue working.
The difficulty arises when the platform has detailed information about the system's operation while the worker sees only an offer, score, penalty or suspension. This creates an information imbalance that can make it difficult to identify errors or challenge unjustified decisions.
International research demonstrates why this deserves attention. Binns et al. (2025), in a peer-reviewed study published in the proceedings of the ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, analysed approximately 1.5 million Uber trips involving 258 drivers in the United Kingdom. Their longitudinal research reported that following the introduction of dynamic pricing, driver pay decreased, the platform's share increased, job allocation and pay became less predictable, inequality between drivers increased, and drivers spent more time waiting for jobs.⁸
The Guardian's June 2025 reporting also described a separate US analysis associated with Columbia Business School that raised concerns about the relationship between upfront pricing, passenger fares, driver payments and the platform's retained share of revenue. Uber disputed the interpretation and maintained that its pricing was designed to be transparent and fair.⁹
These findings should not be directly extrapolated to Malaysia. The studies concern Uber in other markets, with different operating conditions and regulatory arrangements. They do, however, demonstrate that changes in platform pricing and allocation systems can have consequences that are difficult to detect from individual transactions alone.
Algorithmic pricing is not inherently unfair. Opaque, arbitrary or discriminatory decision-making is the more appropriate regulatory target.
Malaysia should strengthen its existing framework in five ways.
First, platforms should provide understandable explanations of the principal factors affecting remuneration, incentive eligibility and significant adverse decisions. Workers do not need unrestricted access to source code, but they should be able to understand the material rules that influence their earnings.
Second, workers should receive itemised earnings statements automatically at appropriate settlement intervals. Section 13 of Act 872 provides a right to request an earnings slip from a qualifying contracting entity. Making detailed statements routine would help workers verify their payments and provide evidence in disputes.
Third, human review must be meaningful. Where a significant automated decision suspends an account or materially affects access to work, the reviewer should have sufficient information and authority to reverse the decision. Workers should receive reasons, access to relevant evidence and a clear appeal process.
Fourth, material changes to remuneration formulas, incentives and allocation rules should be accompanied by appropriate advance notice and consultation. Section 8 already addresses variations to service-agreement terms; further guidance should clarify when an algorithmic or incentive change is sufficiently material to require this process.¹
Finally, Malaysia should introduce risk-based algorithmic audits. These should examine changes in net earnings, waiting time, payout calculations, task allocation, deactivation and appeal outcomes. The purpose is not to assume wrongdoing, but to identify patterns that individual complaints cannot reveal.
The regulator should be able to inspect relevant records confidentially, while public reporting uses aggregated data and safeguards personal information and legitimate commercial secrets.
4. What Malaysia can learn from China's proposed framework
On 8 October 2026, China's Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security published the draft Measures for Protecting the Rights and Interests of Workers in New Forms of Employment for public consultation until 8 November 2026. The official announcement identifies basic labour-rights protection, regulation of labour rules and algorithms, classification of employment arrangements, dispute resolution, supervisory responsibilities and legal liability as central elements of the proposal.¹⁰
The distinction between a draft and an enacted law is essential. As at 15 October 2026, these proposed measures should not be presented as binding Chinese legislation. They represent a proposed regulatory direction, not operative law.
Nevertheless, their policy direction is relevant to Malaysia. China is addressing the challenge of protecting workers who are subject to enterprise labour management but may not satisfy all the criteria for a conventional employment relationship.
Malaysia should adopt three lessons from this approach.
First, legislation should consider how work is actually organised rather than relying exclusively on contractual labels. A person's practical dependence on a platform, the platform's control over remuneration and work allocation, and its disciplinary authority can be relevant to determining what protections should apply.
Second, rules governing labour and algorithmic management should be sufficiently clear to support enforcement. A general obligation to disclose automated systems is a starting point, but it may not be enough to resolve disputes over how a decision was reached.
Third, rights should be accompanied by identifiable enforcement responsibilities and workable dispute-resolution procedures.
Malaysia should not copy China's draft wholesale. The two jurisdictions have different legal systems, administrative arrangements and labour-market institutions. China's proposal is best treated as a source of regulatory ideas whose relevance must be tested against Malaysia's existing Act 872.
5. Lessons from Singapore, Australia and the European Union
Other jurisdictions offer more developed examples of specific mechanisms that Malaysia can adapt. Their legal status differs and should be kept distinct.
Singapore's Platform Workers Act introduced protections from 1 January 2025 covering work injury compensation, Central Provident Fund (CPF) contributions and representation rights. Platform operators are responsible for providing work injury compensation insurance and handling applicable CPF contributions. Higher CPF contribution rates are mandatory for platform workers born on or after 1 January 1995, while older workers may opt in.¹¹
Malaysia can learn from Singapore's approach to ensuring that platform work generates a contribution record and that workers are not left solely responsible for navigating social-protection systems. Its contribution design should, however, reflect Malaysian incomes, institutions and the separate roles of EPF and PERKESO.
Australia offers a different lesson. Its first interim minimum-standards order for qualifying on-demand delivery workers took effect on 17 August 2026. The legally enforceable order includes minimum pay standards, an earnings-floor top-up mechanism, record-keeping requirements, rules concerning vehicle-related expenses and consultation about significant changes.¹²
Malaysia should study the mechanism rather than copy Australia's nominal pay rate. An effective Malaysian earnings standard should be informed by domestic evidence on remuneration, work-related expenses and economically relevant working time. It should also provide clear rules for calculating the shortfall where a qualifying worker's earnings fall below the prescribed floor.
The European Union's Platform Work Directive places particular emphasis on correct employment classification and algorithmic management. It requires Member States to establish effective procedures for determining employment status, using the facts of actual work, including how automated systems organise it. It also provides for a rebuttable presumption of employment where the applicable national criteria indicate direction and control.¹³
As at 15 October 2026, the deadline for Member States to transpose the Directive into national law—2 December 2026—had not yet passed. The Directive should therefore be understood as an adopted EU legislative framework with implementation still due, rather than a uniform set of fully implemented national rules.
Malaysia can adapt the underlying principle: where a platform effectively exercises employer-like control, the legal classification should be assessed on the substance of the relationship. This would not mean that every platform worker must automatically become an employee. It would mean that the law should provide an effective route to determine status where the actual working arrangements justify it.
6. Social protection: strengthen PERKESO and develop platform-funded EPF contributions
Social protection is another area where Malaysia should move beyond reliance on voluntary participation alone.
The Gig Workers Act provides a statutory mechanism for registration and contributions under the Self-Employment Social Security Scheme administered by PERKESO. The implementing social-security regulations specify a contribution deduction rate of 1.25% for the relevant platform transactions, subject to the applicable requirements.¹,² These provisions are an important improvement, but they should not be confused with a separate platform-funded contribution.
Malaysia should consider requiring platform operators to contribute directly towards qualifying workers' PERKESO coverage, with a clear allocation of responsibility and coordination with applicable government matching incentives. This is a recommendation, not a description of an existing general platform-funded contribution obligation.
The Government's Budget 2027 speech announced a matching incentive of 35% for relevant PERKESO contributions, increasing to 50% if platform companies also contribute towards workers' contributions. It also announced a RM160 million package intended to improve net earnings and assist with vehicle maintenance, insurance and social-security contributions from 2027. These are announced measures whose final implementation details should be checked as they are introduced.⁴
Retirement saving requires a complementary approach. EPF's i-Saraan Plus is a voluntary contribution initiative for eligible e-hailing and p-hailing drivers. It provides a government matching incentive of 20% of eligible voluntary contributions, capped at RM600 annually and RM6,000 over a lifetime, subject to its terms and conditions. Platform providers facilitate contributions on behalf of workers, with worker consent.³
Malaysia should consider requiring a compulsory platform-funded EPF contribution for qualifying platform earnings, distinct from the worker's own voluntary saving. One possible starting point for consultation is a contribution equal to 2% of eligible platform remuneration, with a formal review after two years. This is a proposed policy rate, not a rate established as optimal by Malaysian research or current law.
Workers who legally qualify as employees should continue to receive the EPF protections required under ordinary employment law. A lower platform-specific contribution must not become a means of avoiding those obligations.
The Government should also clarify how a new compulsory platform contribution would interact with i-Saraan Plus eligibility. The objective should be to preserve the incentive for eligible workers to make additional voluntary contributions without treating a mandatory platform payment as though it were the worker's own voluntary saving.
7. A proposed Gig Worker Protection and Transition Fund
Beyond individual contributions and platform-specific duties, Malaysia should consider establishing a dedicated Gig Worker Protection and Transition Fund to finance shared services and targeted support that benefit workers across the platform economy.
The proposal draws on a recent Malaysian institutional precedent. On 10 October 2026, the Government announced that it would activate a Postal Service Fund with an initial allocation of RM150 million. Administered by MCMC, the fund is expected to begin operating in the first quarter of 2027 and is intended to support universal postal services, particularly delivery to rural, remote and island communities. The Government said the fund uses the same principle as the telecommunications USP Fund, with relevant provisions already contained in the Postal Services Act 2012.¹⁵
The example is relevant because it demonstrates how a dedicated fund can be organised around a defined statutory purpose. It does not establish that MCMC has the legal authority to levy gig platforms or that the Postal Service Fund itself can finance worker protection. A gig-worker fund would require its own legal basis, contribution rules, governance and spending conditions.
The telecommunications USP Fund provides a second lesson. Established under section 204 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 and administered under the USP Regulations 2002, it requires eligible telecommunications companies with more than RM2 million in relevant annual net revenue to contribute 6% of the determined revenue under the applicable rules.¹⁶,¹⁷ The purpose is to support universal communications access, particularly in underserved areas and among underserved groups.
Malaysia should adapt the principle of pooled sectoral contributions—not copy the 6% telecommunications rate. Telecommunications and gig platforms have different cost structures, revenue models and regulatory objectives. Applying the same percentage to gig platforms without a separate policy analysis would be unjustified.
Why establish a fund?
A dedicated fund could address several needs that are shared across competing platforms. These include independent scrutiny of algorithmic management, preventive occupational-safety programmes, worker access to rights information, targeted support for social-protection contributions and training for workers whose opportunities change as platforms and automation evolve.
The fund should finance additional protections and common services, not replace the legal responsibilities of individual platforms. It must not allow an operator to pay a levy instead of complying with its obligations under Act 872, applicable PERKESO rules or any future EPF contribution requirements.
Nor should it duplicate existing government programmes. Budget 2027 has already announced a RM160 million package, jointly funded by the Government and Grab, to support e-hailing and p-hailing workers from 2027. The new fund should finance only additional eligible activities where there is a clear gap, with the different funding sources disclosed transparently.⁴
Who should contribute?
The fairest starting point would be to require contributions from larger platform operators based on their Malaysian revenue from covered gig services. Smaller operators should receive a meaningful exemption or low threshold so that the regime does not unnecessarily discourage new entry or impose disproportionate administrative costs.
The contribution base should be Malaysia-attributable net platform-service revenue, not the total customer transaction value. Gross merchandise value includes amounts passed through to drivers, riders, merchants and other service providers. Charging directly on that entire amount could create an excessive burden and may encourage platforms to shift costs to workers or consumers.
The rules should define qualifying revenue clearly. Relevant commissions, platform fees and other revenue attributable to covered gig services could be included, with appropriate treatment of refunds, statutory taxes, gratuities and genuine pass-through payments. Related companies should be aggregated where necessary to prevent businesses from splitting their operations merely to avoid the threshold.
A possible starting point for public consultation would exempt the first RM5 million of annual Malaysian covered platform-service revenue. A progressive contribution could then apply to the qualifying portions above the threshold: 1% on the portion up to RM100 million, 1.5% on the portion between RM100 million and RM500 million, and 2% on the portion above RM500 million.
These figures are policy proposals, not existing statutory rates or empirically proven optimal levels. The thresholds and rates should be tested against confidential, auditable platform accounts before legislation is introduced.
A marginal schedule is preferable to applying one percentage to an operator's entire revenue as soon as it crosses a threshold. It avoids a sudden jump in liability and allows the contribution to increase progressively with the scale of the business.
How large might the fund be?
The amount cannot yet be forecast reliably because a complete, publicly verified dataset of Malaysian platform-service revenue by operator is not available in a form sufficient to calculate the contribution base.
An indicative estimate is nevertheless possible. The Google, Temasek and Bain e-Conomy SEA 2025 Malaysia report places the transport-and-food digital sector at approximately US$4 billion in gross merchandise value in 2025.¹⁸ This is transaction value, not platform revenue. Using an illustrative exchange rate of RM4.30 per US dollar gives a market value of approximately RM17.2 billion.
The Southeast Asian report gives regional 2025 estimates of approximately US$2.4 billion in food-delivery revenue on US$23 billion in GMV, and US$1.9 billion in transport revenue on US$11.5 billion in GMV.¹⁹ Those ratios suggest that platform revenue may be much smaller than transaction value, with food delivery and transport showing different revenue-to-GMV relationships.
If these regional ratios are used only as rough benchmarks for Malaysia, they imply platform-service revenue of approximately RM1.8 billion to RM2.8 billion from the transport-and-food segment. This is an analytical proxy, not observed Malaysian revenue or a forecast of the amount legally subject to a levy.
The proportion of that revenue above the proposed exemption threshold is also unknown. If, purely for scenario analysis, 60% to 90% of the proxy revenue qualified, the contribution base would be approximately RM1.1 billion to RM2.6 billion. A flat effective rate of 1.5% on that illustrative base would generate roughly RM16 million to RM38 million annually, with a central scenario of about RM26 million.
A reasonable initial planning range is therefore approximately RM20 million to RM40 million per year, subject to validation. The actual yield from the proposed graduated rate schedule could be different because the distribution of revenue across operators is not known. The Government should not present this estimate as a committed revenue forecast.
Before deciding the final rate, regulators should obtain confidential data on covered Malaysian revenues, related-company structures, commissions, other qualifying fees and current expenditure on worker protection. These data would allow a more reliable estimate of the contribution base and the burden on individual platforms.
How should the fund be administered?
Although the MCMC examples are valuable, the proposed fund should not automatically be placed under MCMC. Telecommunications and postal-service funds have sector-specific legal purposes. A fund principally concerned with labour protection, social insurance and worker transition would fit more naturally within Malaysia's labour and social-protection institutions.
The preferred arrangement would be a dedicated statutory fund under the Ministry of Human Resources, with PERKESO and EPF involved in matters within their respective mandates. MCMC could participate in platform-related regulatory coordination and technical issues where this falls within its legal powers.
The fund's governance should include government, gig-worker representatives, platform operators and independent experts. It should publish audited accounts, contribution rules, allocation criteria, administrative expenditure, approved commitments and measurable outcomes. Workers and the public should be able to see how the money is used.
This transparency requirement is especially important in light of the telecommunications USP experience. Khazanah Research Institute's 2023 assessment reported that the USP Fund had accumulated RM10.6 billion by the end of 2021, while recommending more detailed programme reporting and easier access to allocation information. That balance is a historical figure, not the current balance.¹⁶
A new gig-worker fund should not accumulate money merely because the law permits it to collect contributions. It should maintain a defined reserve, allocate resources against measurable needs and undergo independent review after three years. If contributions consistently exceed justified expenditure, the rate should be reconsidered rather than allowing the balance to grow without a clear public purpose.
8. Collective representation, safety and effective remedies
Fair platform work cannot be achieved through individual disclosures alone. Workers need practical channels to raise collective concerns.
Act 872 recognises gig workers' rights to form, join and participate in associations. Malaysia should build on this foundation by encouraging regular, structured dialogue between worker representatives, platforms and public authorities. Discussions should include material changes to earnings, incentives, safety rules and automated decision-making.
The proposed Gig Worker Protection and Transition Fund could support worker education and access to independent advice, but it should not act as a substitute for collective representation or the dispute-resolution mechanisms established by the Act.
Occupational safety requires similar attention. The Malaysian rider study provides evidence that physical risks deserve preventive intervention, but the law should not assume that every injury arises from an algorithm. Platforms should review dispatch deadlines, performance incentives and working conditions for risks that can reasonably be prevented.¹,⁶
The existing conciliation and tribunal framework should also be monitored carefully. The Government should publish aggregated information on complaint volumes, resolution times, outcomes and compliance with awards. Such publication would help determine whether the new legal remedies are accessible and effective.
An additional question deserves scrutiny: Act 872 defines a gig worker by reference to Malaysian citizenship or permanent residence.¹ The Government should assess how platform workers who fall outside that definition are treated under other applicable laws and ensure that the relationship between the regimes is clear. This is a question for legal review, not proof that every excluded person lacks all protection.
9. A practical reform agenda for Malaysia
The next stage should focus on measures that can be implemented through existing institutions where legally authorised, with targeted regulation or amendments where necessary.
First, Malaysia should finalise an evidence-based minimum-earnings standard through the Gig Workers Consultative Council. The standard should account for relevant work-related expenses and establish a transparent method for determining whether qualifying earnings fall below the prescribed floor.
Second, the Government should make earnings statements more accessible and strengthen the rules governing significant automated decisions. Workers should be able to understand material pay calculations, challenge serious errors and receive timely human review.
Third, Malaysia should strengthen social protection by evaluating platform-funded contributions to PERKESO and developing an appropriate EPF contribution for qualifying platform earnings. The interaction with existing statutory protections and i-Saraan Plus eligibility must be clarified before introducing new obligations.
Fourth, it should consult on the Gig Worker Protection and Transition Fund, publishing the proposed contribution base, exemption threshold, rate schedule, spending purposes and governance arrangements. The RM20 million to RM40 million annual planning range should be refined using actual platform data before any final rate is prescribed.
Fifth, regulators should establish a common set of indicators for assessing worker outcomes, including net earnings, contribution coverage, complaints, deactivation, dispute-resolution times, workplace injuries and the results of algorithmic audits. The new fund should be evaluated against the same principle: resources should be directed towards measurable improvements, not merely collected or spent.
Finally, the Government should review the framework after sufficient implementation data have accumulated, with worker representatives, platforms and independent researchers participating in the process.
The Budget 2027 speech states that the Gig Workers Consultative Council was still negotiating minimum-income rates, the formula for calculating income and minimum social-protection standards, with completion expected in early 2027.⁴ Those matters should therefore be treated as announced or ongoing policy processes rather than settled legal standards.
Conclusion: regulate the exercise of platform power, not technology for its own sake
Malaysia should not seek to eliminate the flexibility that makes platform work valuable. Nor should it assume that every algorithm, incentive or variable price is inherently unfair.
The more defensible objective is to ensure that flexibility does not become a justification for opaque remuneration, arbitrary decisions, inadequate protection or ineffective remedies.
China's draft framework demonstrates the importance of addressing workers subject to enterprise labour management and regulating algorithmic systems, but it remains a proposed measure rather than enacted Chinese law. Singapore shows how platform operators can be assigned explicit responsibilities for injury protection, retirement contributions and representation. Australia offers a model for enforceable minimum standards and earnings-floor top-ups. The EU provides an adopted legislative framework for employment-status determination and algorithmic accountability, with national implementation still due as of the date considered here.
Malaysia's strongest path is to build on Act 872 rather than duplicate it: make earnings records automatic, clarify algorithmic disclosure and review, audit high-impact decisions, improve social protection, support collective representation and publish evidence of implementation.
The proposed Gig Worker Protection and Transition Fund could add a further layer of support by financing shared services and targeted assistance that individual platforms may not provide adequately on their own. The MCMC USP and Postal Service Fund models show that pooled sectoral funding is institutionally possible, but they do not establish that a gig-platform levy is automatically justified. A dedicated fund would need its own legal basis, proportionate contribution rules, clear objectives and transparent governance.
The central test is straightforward: can a gig worker understand how pay is determined, challenge a significant error, obtain the social protection provided by law and participate meaningfully in discussions that affect working conditions?
A regulatory framework that can answer yes to those questions would preserve the benefits of digital platforms while making gig work more secure, accountable and fair.
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References (APA 7th edition)
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